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Special Topic 1: The A-bomb and Medical History
Perspectives of  the Year 1945 and Turning Points in 
the History of  Science
Yuriko TAnAkA
Abstract: Recent studies illustrate the plurality of  historical contexts around the emergence of  the 
atomic bomb in 1945 and illuminate the subsequent power politics among different historical interpre-
tations.  There are historical issues whose impact holds so much gravity that the issue’s historiography 
entails divergent implications.  The context in which the atomic bomb was created could lead to prob-
lematic historiographies.  In this essay I examine multiple and parallel scientific contexts regarding the 
search for atomic existence and investigations into related experiences and practices before and after 
1945.  Those scientific contexts present different rhythms and multiple directions.  A historiography 
with plural viewpoints should be designed to trace the history of  those interacting scientific activities.
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1. Plurality, Politics, and History of the Atomic Bomb
In the paper entitled “Beyond Peace: Pluralizing Japan’s Nuclear History” (2012), Shi Lin 
Loh closely examined divergent scenes in the aftermath of  atomic bombings in Nagasaki 
and Hiroshima in 1945, and revealed how “the national readings,” namely the official forms 
of  acceptance about these two historical events, had worked effectively in postwar Japan 
to “elide” other immediate and colorful narratives of  the experience.1  Loh pointed out that 
throughout the following decade, realities in those two cities were overshadowed by ongo-
ing “other major events: the Allied Occupation of  Japan, the start of  the Cold War and the 
crackdown on Communism, and the Korean War.”2  It was only after these new post-wartime-
related political and economic conditions in the country had been established that the real 
national image-building around the atomic bombings began in Japan.  By then there were 
new national policies and priorities that underlay the re-building of  “Nuclear History” in 
Japan.3
Ran Zwigenberg called this historical setting “the turbulent 1950s,” in his book Hiroshima: 
The Origins of  Global Memory Culture (2014),4 where people both within and outside the 
atomic-bombed cities oscillated among various representations of  the A-bomb experience. 
On the other hand, Zwigenberg also traced the gradual and complicated—emotionally as well 
as politically—process, going back to 1945, in which survivors and Hiroshima city officials 
had chosen the symbolic image of  peace and eventually adopted the exceptional position of  
“victim-martyre.”5  Zwigenberg’s keen attention on the value-producing role of  the “moral 
witness”6 elucidates the intense conflicts and negotiations, even among those “memories” 
often believed to be the most immediate.
Why, and how, has this synthesis of  certain representative or powerful, narratives 
taken shape?  Nakao Maika referred to such terms as “dream,” “magic,” and “lie,” in the 
closing chapter of  her book, Kaku No Yuwaku [Allure of  Nuclear] (2015),7 arguing that these 
 1 Shi Lin Loh, “Beyond Peace: Pluralizing Japan’s Nuclear History,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, vol. 10, 
issue 11, no. 6 (March 5, 2012). https://apjjf.org/2012/10/11/Shi-Lin-Loh/3716/article.html [Accessed 
November 15, 2018]
 2 Ibid.
 3 Among them were Eisenhower’s promotion of  the idea of  “Atoms for Peace” and need for new 
electric infrastructure in Japan as a developing country during 1950s. Cf. “Conclusion,” Ibid.
 4 Ran Zwigenberg, Hiroshima: The Origins of  Global Memory Culture, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014) p. 94.
 5 Ibid., pp. 23–93, especially p. 86.
 6 Ibid., pp. 18–19.
 7 Nakao Maika, Kaku no Yūwaku: Senzen Nihon No Kagaku Bunka To ‘Genshiryoku Yūtopia’ No 
Shutshugen [Allure of  Nuclear: Science Culture in Prewar Japan and the Emergence of  “Atomic 
Utopia”], (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo, 2015) pp. 327–335.
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forms of  ambiguity or blindness generated around nuclear science during the 1900s to the 
1930s had strongly attracted every kind of  popular imagination in prewar Japan, which, in 
turn, built up an “Atomic Utopia.” Those promising “lies” or “jests”8 had emerged through a 
hybridization of  different voices such as scientific ambition, people’s aspirations, or military 
propaganda, as Nakao vividly described.  Those voices overpowered any opposing claims, 
until the next “true word” unequivocally presented itself, namely the actual exploding atomic 
bomb, and those previously powerful voices had to admit defeat.
Loh, Zwigenberg, and Nakao powerfully illustrate the plurality of  possible historical 
contexts and interpretations surrounding the A-bomb in 1945.  They also illuminate the 
power-politics among those contexts and interpretations: from those politics a certain hege-
monic narrative emerged, which overshadowed the immediate confusions or indeterminacy 
around the incident.
 8 Nakao introduces an article in a Japanese journal Asahi Graph that includes a picture of  an atomic 
explosion with a caption saying “Many a true word spoken in jest (uso kara deta makoto)” (see 
Figure 1) and insightfully examines meanings and origins of  this “uso (lie, jest)”(Ibid., p. 1 & 
p. 334–335).
Figure 1: An image of  atomic bomb captioned “Many a true word spoken in jest”, from Asahi Graph, 
vol. 1139, 1946, p. 12, cited in Nakao, Kaku No Yuwaku, p. 1.
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There are certain broad historical issues whose impact holds so much gravity that their 
historiographies should almost immediately entail political or ethical implications.9  What 
happened around the atomic bomb before and after 1945 is such a broad historical issue, 
which could lead to historiographical problematics.  For instance, as Zwigenberg rightly 
points out in his book, that the atomic bombings in 1945 had to be defined as “a mistake,”10 
should be interpreted in the context of  the need to cope with the heaviness of  what had hap-
pened.  As such, what was considered “normal” and “temporal slippage,”11 became fluid in 
sorting out the courses of  history.
2.  Entangled Developments in the History of Science Surrounding the Atomic 
Bomb
Accepting the A-bomb as “a mistake” or a “slippage into a darker time”12 is a quite com-
mon attitude in the period after the atomic bombings.  As has often been discussed13 in the 
history of  the atomic bomb, narratives about who made the mistake tend to be rather ambigu-
ous.  In a similar way, from where the slippage happened is not clear either.  In other words, 
where the “normal” course of  history had been, is uncertain.
From this standpoint, turning to the history of  science before and after the atomic 
bombings, we notice some confusing twists and shifts that eventually led to various “never 
imagined”14 outcomes.  For reference, Figures 2 provides a brief  chronology of  significant 
scientific events surrounding the invention of  the atomic bomb.
Werner Heisenberg, who together with Niels Bohr, discovered the foundations for quan-
 9 On this point, Zwigenberg’s book contained another powerful investigation through the examina-
tion of  the forms of  commemoration juxtaposing Hiroshima and Auschwitz. Cf. Hayden White, 
“Historical Emplotment and the Problem of  Truth,” in Probing the Limits of  Representation: 
Nazism and the “Final Solution,” ed. by Saul Friedlander, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1992) pp. 37–53; Hashimoto Nobuya, Kioku No Seiji: Yōroppa No Rekishi Ninshiki Funsou 
[Politics of  Memories: European Conflicts about Historical Perceptions], (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2016).
 10 Zwigenberg, Hiroshima, p. 2.
 11 Ibid.
 12 Ibid.
 13 Zwigenberg vividly illustrates the striking absence of  subjectivity in the explanatory discourses 
concerning the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, which has been presented as if  it were “separated 
from any historical chain of  events” and narrated only as “history in the passive voice” (Carol 
Gluck). Ibid., pp. 1–2.
 14 David Lochbaum, Edwin Lyman, Susan Stranahan, The Union of  Concerned Scientists, Fukushima: 
The Story of  a Nuclear Disaster, (New York: The New Press, 2015), pp. 1–33 (Chapter 1: “March 11, 
2011: A Situation We had Never Imagined”).
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tum physics (opposing Einstein) and asserted the revolutionary uncertainty principle, testi-
fied that he had been certain in 1941 that the production of  the atomic bomb during the 
World War II would be technically impossible and shared that certainty with Bohr.15  Even 
on the day of  the atomic detonation in Hiroshima, Heisenberg was doubtful that the weapon 
was truly atomic, this time pointing to financial and psychological obstacles that, in the-
ory, should prevent the realization of  the atomic weapon both in Germany and the United 
States.16  Heisenberg’s doubt regarding the atomic bomb was later judged as proof  of  his 
incompetence by fellow physiologist Samuel Goudsmit.17  After the defeat of  Germany in 
WWII, Heisenberg was freed from and proceeded to stand against German military moti-
vated atomic research, and rather worked on “grand” and “general” theoretical problems.18 
 15 Weiner Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze: Gespräche im Umkreis der Atomphysik, (München/
Berlin: Piper Verlag, 1996[1969]), pp. 213–214.
 16 Ibid., pp. 226–227.
 17 Suzuki Masashi, Busshitsu Kara Seimei He: 20-Seiki Kagakushi No Tenkan To Nihon [From the 
“Material” to the “Life”: Re-direction of  the 20th Science History and Japan], (Tokyo: Gakken, 
2009), p. 99.
 18 Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze, pp. 286–287.
Figure 2: Scientific events around the invention of  the atomic bomb, 1895–1953
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Heisenberg was pursuing the theoretical states of  the world which no one else had explained, 
but the practical reality that was produced during the wartime went beyond his prospects. 
How should we interpret this gap from a prominent scientist?
In Figure 2, there are three major and distinct scientific contexts: the physical-material, 
the experimental-technological, and the genetic-biological.  The physical-material context 
started with the discovery of  the X-ray by Röntgen, namely an encounter with material in an 
unknown state that would eventually lead to a series of  discoveries of  cosmic rays, radioac-
tive materials, and elements.
This notion of  radioactivity, on the other hand, led to the technical search for the exis-
tence of  atoms through optical traces and the theoretical bases of  those traces or experimen-
tal proofs.  Simultaneously, the notion of  the atom was nothing but an ancient philosophical 
explanation for the whole materials.  The impacts and implications of  the development of  
atomic science around the turn of  the twentieth century were enormous.  In this scientific 
context, the above mentioned “grand” theoretical problems for Heisenberg should lie too. 
The new reality of  atomic existence profoundly changed how to deal with ancient ontological 
questions.
The combination of  theoretical and experimental physics presented new areas of  inquiry 
and methods for scientific activities.  From these experimental practices arose the possibili-
ties of  using and manipulating the energy within atoms, around the time of  Einstein’s “mir-
acle year.” Surely the idea was in the form of  a hypothesis at first, which, as Nakao’s book 
argues,19 drew various images of  aspirations or dreams, partly presented by scientists in 
their pedagogic popular speeches and then widely spread with vulgar variations.
Certainly, the fulfillment of  those vulgar aspirations regarding scientific research out-
comes should be classified as “applications.” Among those applications of  what was going 
on within atomic physical science, for example, is case of  “Petite-Curie,” a car equipped with 
the X-ray device designed by Marie Curie to serve during World War I (see Figure 3).  X-rays 
were used to locate wounds inside the bodies of  injured soldiers for medical treatment.
As shown in Figure 2, this “Petite-Curie” application had little to do with scientific find-
ings that came after the world wars concerning radioactive effects on the molecular structure 
of  living bodies.
Possible effects of  radioactivity on living bodies became a scientific interest around 1927, 
where highly elusive mutations in animals were theoretically connected to atomic collisions 
with quantum movements inside various cosmic rays running across the natural world.20 
This genetic-biological context regarding the history of  the atomic bomb is the most remote 
from the military motivated technological developments, yet remained in the background 
 19 Nakao, Kaku No Yūwaku, pp. 31–51.
 20 Suzuki, “Busshitsu” Kara “Seimei” He, pp. 33–36 & pp. 43–44.
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until the 1950s when it came forward as a new terrain for the exploration of  biological sci-
ence.
The connections between nuclear radiation and living bodies, which attracted the atten-
tion of  Bohr as well, were the subject of  the life vicissitudes and research led by Nishina 
Yoshio, a leading figure in Japan’s atomic science efforts during the 1930s and the 1940s.21
Nishina studied physics under the instruction of  Bohr at the Institute for Theoretical 
Physics at Copenhagen University from 1923- to 1928.  Nishina was appointed by the Japanese 
government to conduct military research, including the development of  the atomic bomb that 
was ordered in 1943.  Many of  Nishina’s pupils and colleagues testified that the research 
lacked both financial and material resources and Nishina knew the Japanese researchers 
would never achieve the goal, though he had once built a small cyclotron with the aid of  
American physiologist Ernest Lawrence in 1937.  Tsuji Tetsuo, one of  Nishina’s disciples, 
mentioned that Lawrence and Nishina had a common interest in biological radiation studies.22 
While Nishina never developed an atomic bomb, based on his knowledge he knew for certain 
that an atomic weapon had exploded in Hiroshima in 1945 when he visited the city two days 
after the bombing.  When his cyclotron was destroyed by the GHP in 1945 he shifted his 
research to the production of  Penicillin but died from liver cancer in 1951.
Even over the course of  just Nishina’s life, the aforementioned three major contexts 
regarding atomic research intermingled, and what resulted did not correspond to what he 
 21 Tamaki Hidehiko & Ezawa Hiroshi (eds.), Nishina Yoshio: Nihon No Genshi Kagaku No Akebono 
[Nishina Yoshio: The Dawn of  Japan’s Atomic Science], (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 2005[1991]).
 22 Ibid., p. 30. Cf. Tsuji Tetsuo, Butsurigakushi He No Michi [A Road toward the History of  Physics], 
(Tokyo: Kobushi Bunko, 2011, p. 218, 234.
Figure 3: M. Curie in one of  “Petite Curie”
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thought he knew, intended, or prospected.  Could he have led a more “normal” life course, but 
for the wartime related factors?
Around the atomic bomb, what science could tell us and what it could not were entan-
gled.  A group of  scientists in 1940s succeeded in triggering atomic chain reactions and 
developed the machines to do so in a portable size.  But no scientist had ever answered the 
ontological questions pursued by Heisenberg until his death.  Various systems of  knowledge 
and issues of  different natures together constituted the body of  science.  Each of  those sys-
tems of  knowledge and issues or objectives developed in divergent directions and on differ-
ent rhythms.  A bomb was developed before the whole nature of  the atom was understood. 
Regarding the “normal” outcome of  this historical situation discussed above, which, in real-
ity, was never realized, could it have been different from what we know as our history?  We 
should ask how and where we would reconstruct such normality.
3. In Place of a Conclusion: Pluralizing History and Science
In place of  a conclusion, I quote here two important remarks on historiography vis-à-vis 
the history of  science after the twentieth century.
In a paper entitled “Science Is Dead; Long Live Science” (2012),23 Peter Dear declared at 
the very opening of  his argument: “There is nothing novel in proclaiming the diversity of  
those activities and bodies of  knowledge that we call science; the theme of  the “disunity of  
science” is nowadays a familiar one. . . . And yet little has been done about it.”24  Dear ques-
tions “are we concerned with the history of  science or with the history of  “science?”” and his 
answer is that he should work on the second type of  science history, by tracking an “ideol-
ogy.” Dear continues, “[t]his ideology presents the appearance of  unity where none truly 
exists.  A broader vision of  the development of  this ideology, integrated with some of  the 
more signal examples of  the knowledge, activities, and practices that have come to constitute 
it, may help to exorcise the totalizing ghost of  “science” while still telling us what it is.”25
On the other hand, Charles Gillispie asserted in 1981, in a lecture on “The Coming of  Age 
of  American Science, 1910–1970,”26 that he could not agree to call what “the whole story of  
19th-century American science” had produced, “their [Foulton, Whitney etc.] machines and a 
thousand others,” as “applications” while they are “too vigorous to be classified as parasites 
 23 Peter Dear, “Science Is Dead; Long Live Science,” OSIRIS, vol. 27 (2017), pp. 37–55.
 24 Ibid., p. 37.
 25 Ibid. p. 39.
 26 Charles Coulston Gillispie, “The Neesima Lectures I: The Coming of  Age of  American Science, 
1910–1970,” in Essays and Reviews in History and History of  Science, (Philadelphia: American 
Philosophical Society, 2007), pp. 199–210.
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drawing their vitality from a body of  science with its real life somewhere.”27
At least the axiom posed by August Comte, as Dear too mentioned the name in his 
paper,28 “[f]rom science comes prevision, from prevision comes action,”29 is not applicable 
to what we have witnessed.  Comte is one of  the first “scientific” minds who conceived the 
modern, very “new” historical consciousness toward human knowledge and practices in nine-
teenth century Europe.  Since then, human scientific “actions” have developed to the extent 
where “the science” is not capable of  certain “previsions,” while those “actions” should keep 
making historical outcomes toward the future.  History takes plural forms.  As such, our 
historiography should follow this plurality.
 27 Ibid., p. 200.
 28 Dear, “Science is Dead,” p. 38.
 29 August Comte, Cours de philosophie positive, [1830] dans Philosophie des sciences, présentation, 
choix de textes et notes par Juliette Grange, (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), p. 90.
